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Abstract. Certificate veritication in PKI is a complex and timc consuming proccss. In the classical PKI methodology, in 
order to obtain a public key and to acccpt a ccrtificatc as valid, a verifier necds to extract a certificate path from the PKI 
and to verify tbe ccrtiticatcs on this patb recursively. Lcvi proposcd a nestcd ccrtificate modcl 'vvith the aim to simplify 
and speed up certilicate verification. Such a nesled ccrtificatc-based PKI significantly improvcs certificate verification, 
but it also requires a large increuse in the number 0[" issued certificates, which l11ukes this model impractical for real life 
deployment. In order to solvc tbis drawback of nested PKI, while retaining its speed in certificate verification, we 
propose in ihis paper tbe innovative concept of a compressed nested certificate, wbich is a signilicantly modified 
version of the nested eertilieate model. Compresscd ncsted certificate PKI dcploys compressed nestcd certificates 
which speed up and simplify certificate verification while keeping celiifieate load to a minimum, tbus providing 
implementers thc option of intcgrating it into the existing PKI model or building it separatcly as an indepcndcnllllodcl. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Public Key Infrastructure, or PKI, is designed to provide an authentic public key distribution across a large 
range of applications through digital certificates that include a combination of personal data about the 
certificate holder and the certificate, as welJas the certificate's public key and digital signature. Various 
PKIs have been proposed in the literature, such as Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM), Secure Electronic 
Transaction (SET), Simple Public Key Infrastructure (SPKI) and Domain Name System Security Extensions 
(DNSSEC). Most of them are based on the third edition of the ISOITTU-T X.S09 (1998) certificate standard. 
Although the X.S09 standard does not enforce any topology for a standard PKI, X.S09-based PKIs are 
generally hierarchical and centralised (Adams & Lloyd 2003). That is why we will suppose that the PKI 
analysed in this paper has a hierarchical structure. Three important characteristics of hierarchical X.S09-
based PKI topology are: a tree with 3 or more levels; strict distinction between CAs and end-users (i.e. only 
CAs issue certilicates); forming optional networks via cross certificates. However, one of the major 
limitations of hierarchical PKJ models is that their relatively long certificate paths make certificate 
validation complex. In the classical PKI methodology, in order to obtain a public key and to accept a 
certificate as valid, a verifier needs to extract a certificate path from the PKI, and to verify the certificates on 
this path recursively. 
Levi (1999) proposed the concept of nested certificates with the aim to simplify and to speed up the 
certi ficate verification process. Nested certificates are a special kind of certificate issued for other 
certificates. A PKI that deploys nested certificates, known as a nested certificate-based PKI (NPKI), speeds 
up cryptographic digital certificate verification and reduces the number of certificate revocation controls. In 
order to verify a certificate with its certificate path, a verifier is required to perform a cryptographic 
verification for the first certificate only while other certificates are verified just by using fast hash 
computations. The nested certificate-based PKI model efficiently improves verification, but it also generates 
large numbers of certificates in a system. This large certificate load is the major problem that makes NPKJ 
impractical for real life deployment. In this paper, in order to solve the problem of high certificate load in 
NPKI, while retaining its computational efficiency, we introduce the concept of a compressed nested 
certificate. 
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A compressed nested certificate is an advanced version of the nested cettificate that is issued for several 
certificates simultaneously in order to speed up verification and to minimize the number of certificates 
generated. A PKI that deploys compressed nested certificates, which we call a Compressed Nested PKI 
(CNPKI), also has the advantage of reducing the number of certificate revocation controls since at most two 
certificate revocation checks are sufficient. Thus, our CNPKI model has the advantages of fast and simple 
verification with, as we shall show, virtually no increase in the number of certificates over classical 
hierarchical PKJ (for large systems), thus providing a superior solution to both classical and nested PKI. 
In section 2, we introduce the certificate validation problem. In section 3, we describe nested certificates. 
Sections 4, 5, 6 and 7 introduce and analyse our new model as well as presenting revocation and security 
scenarios. We conclude in section 8. 
2 PKI AND THE CERTIFICATE VALIDATION PROBLEM 
In every PKI model (with the exception ofPGP) cettificates are issued by trusted Certification Authorities 
(CAs). A verifier always verifies first a digital signature of the CA over the CNs cettificate before he 
verifies the user's certificate. In this way the trustworthiness of the user's certificate is established 
(I-Ienderson et at. 2002) .. Most often there are too many end-users and the work-load is too large to be 
handled by a single CA; thus more than one CA is deployed within a network; which Jeads to the most 
common PKI model, that with a hierarchical structure. In this case, each user receives her/his certificate with 
its certificate path statting with the Root CNs certificate and finishing with the end-user's cettificate 
(Cooper et al. 2005) .. A verifier only wants to find the public key of the target entity, and to check 
correctness of binding between a public key and the identity of the certificate holder. However, he needs to 
verify all certificates on the cettificate path one by one in order to check the validity of his certificate. 
Ordinary verification of a single certificate is a complex and time consuming process (Lloyd 2002), which 
consists of: 
• Calculation and checking the certificate's signature value; 
• Checking the validity period and the validity of the certificate policy; 
• Checking intended key usage; 
• Checking the revocation status of the certificate. 
Cryptographic verification or the certiticate's signature value and checking of the revocation status of the 
certificate are the two most time-consuming and expensive parts of the verification. Tn order to verifY the 
certificate path, the verifier needs to check the revocation status of each single intermediate certificate and to 
store the public keys of the certificates of all CAs involved within his security domain (Lloyd 2002). 
One way of improving certificate path verification time is to make the CA responsible for verifying the 
public keys ofthe end users via certificate paths and for issuing direct classical certificates for them. A 
similar approach is used within the ICE-TEL (Chadwick et al. 1997) model. However, direct certification 
can rarely be used for hierarchical PKIs where the topology and trust relationships must be preserved due to 
pre-established relationships between CAs at different levels. Levi in (\999), proposes NPKT to extract 
efficiently verifiable certificate paths. NPKI is based on a nested certification concept, where both classical 
and nested certificates are used together. The verifier, in order to verify a certificate using its nested 
certificate path (described in section 3), performs only one cryptographic computation during the certificate 
verification process, whereas in the classical PKI model he must perform two or more cryptographic 
computations depending on the path length. 
However, as pointed out earlier, the NPKT model is impractical for large scale deployment, since it greatly 
increases the certificate load in the system. This increase is not evenly distributed among CAs in the 
hierarchy. Higher level CAs produce more certificates than lower-level CAs, with the Root CA supporting 
the largest increase. This is the major drawback of the NPKI model. A large additional increase in the 
number of certificates issued by the Root CA evolves down to additional certificate issuing costs at lower 
levels. A comparative analysis of the number of certificates issued is given in section 5. 
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In this paper we solve the drawback of Levi's NPKI model by introducing Compressed Nested PKI in which 
celtificate verification time is identical to that in the NPKI model while the total number of certificates 
issued in a system (and by the Root CA) is very close to the total number of certificates issued. Thus, our 
model provides a fast certificate verification process while preserving the trust structure and topology of the 
original model allowing implementers the option of paltial integration with existing PKI or building it as an 
independent model. 
3 NESTED CERTIFICATES 
In tackling the problem of time spent verifying the public key of each certificate in a chain of certificates, 
Levi (1999) introduced the nested certificate model with the aim of reducing the number of publ ic key 
cryptographic computations during a verification process. Tn the classical PKI model, the verifier only wants 
to find a public key of the celtificate user, and to check correctness of binding between the public key and 
the identity of the certificate holder. However, he needs to cryptographically verify all certificates on the 
certification path in order to verify the certificate of the certificate user. Cryptographic verification ofa 
certificate is done by: 
Obtaining the public key from the CA and cryptographically un-signing the signature to obtain the hash of 
the certificate data; 
Calculating the hash of the same certificate data directly; and 
Comparing these two values. 
This is a time inefficient process. 
Levi's model is based on a nested certification [7] concept. A nested certificate is simply defined as "a 
certificate for another certificate" (Figure 1). 
-
Certificate issuer 
CA2 -
~ 
·0 U 0 Certificate end user 
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---.. Classical certificate 
----. Nested certificate 
Fig. 1. The certificate relationships 
A classical certificate assures that the binding between the public key and the user's identity is correct. A 
nested certificate, on the other hand, certifies another certificate. The latter is implemented to verifY the 
legitimacy of the digital signature of another certificate and the integrity of data within that other certificate. 
Levi's NPKI model is based on this nested celtification concept. A certificate that has been certified by a 
nested certificate is called a subject certificate (Levi etal. 2004) .. A celtification path in this model may 
contain both nested and classical certificates, but it should always end with a classical certificate. Also 
within any nested certificate path, only a first certificate needs to be verified cryptographically while all 
other certificates can be verified as subject certificates. 
In order to verify a subject certificate a verifier needs to perform the following two steps: 
To recalculate a hash of the subject certificate content and to check whether it is the same as the one stored 
within the nested certificate; 
To compare the signature over the content of the subject celtificate with the subject certificate's signature 
stored within the nested certificate. These two values should be the same. 
As can be seen, the subject celtificate verification does not use public key cryptographic computation. It 
performs only one fast hash function computation. Therefore, since subject certificate verification is more 
efficient than public key cryptographic protocol computation, the use of nested certificates reduces the 
overall verification time along a certificate chain. Levi shows in (1999) that the certificate path verification 
time within his model is reduced by a factor of 8 to a factor of3000 depending 011 the size and complexity of 
the structure. 
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a. A certificate path with classical 
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b. A nested certificate path 
Fig. 2. Examples of certificate paths with nested certificates 
A nested certificate path is a certificate path in which all cel1ificates in a path are nested cel1ificates except a 
last certificate which must always be a classical certificate (Levi et al. 2004). Figure 2b shows a nested 
certt/icale path, whereas Figure 2a is a certificate path that contains nested certificates in it but is not a 
nested certificate path. In Figure 2a certificates I, 2 and 3 are verified cryptographically, whereas certificates 
4 and 5 are verified as subject certificates of the nested certificate. That means that the verifier would need 
to perform three public key cryptographic computations for the certificate with this certification path. A 
nested certificate path is given by 3, 4 and 5. 
4 COMPRESSED NESTED CERTIFICATES - OUR MODEL 
A nested certificate by definition does not provide any identity assurance of an entity. The purpose of a 
nested certificate is to assure legitimacy and integrity of a subject certificate. In other words it assures that 
thc subject certificate content has been signed by the claimed CA, and that it has not been maliciously 
modified. This means that a nested cel1ificate does not need to verify a single subject certificate. Therefore, 
our proposed new certificate, which we call a compressed nested certificate (CNC), allows simultaneous 
verification of a number of different subject certHicates. We say that a nested certificate which verifies data 
of two or more subject ce11ificates has the one-la-many property. Classical and nested certificates have the 
one-la-one property. 
Figure 3 shows a Compressed NPKI where each compressed nested certificate verifies two subject 
certificates. 
In order to provide identity assurance and integrity of subject ceI1ificates, a compressed nested certificate 
needs to contain both hash values and digital signatures over the subject certificate's contents along with 
some unique identifier of the subject certificate, such as the certificate serial number. 
C1as s ical celt ificate 
Conl'rcssed 
Nested certificate 
Fig. 3. An example ofa CNPKI 
A compressed nested certificate is a certificate for other certificates; or in other words it is a node-to-arc arc 
(as described by Figure 3). Compressed nested certificates can be used together with classical certificates in 
the corresponding CNPKJ model. Tn the CNPKT, a Compressed Nested CA behaves like a classical CA. The 
aim or the compressed nested certificate is to improve the verification speed of the end-user's certificate 
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with a minimal increase in the certificate load. Therefore, we stipulate that compressed nested certificate 
paths be issued only for end-user certificates and not for classical certificates that belong to other CAs. Now, 
the basic compressed nested certificate issuance rule is the following: 
Let CA be afixed upper cert?/ication authority and CAe be the set qfcertificate authorities that have been 
certified by the C~. In order to issue a compressed nested certificate, CA needs to check the validity qfthe 
public keys of each member ofCA' and al.~o the validity of the certificates issued by members o/CAe. After 
that the CA can safety issue compressed nested certificates/or certificates issued by authorities in CAe. 
In the initial step, a compressed nested celtificate path propagates fi'om end nodes towards the Root CA. The. 
bottom level CAs issue only end-user certificates. Compressed nested certificates are issued by the lowest 
level CAs who certifY other CAs. Also each CA in the CNPKI has a choice whether it wants to issue a 
compressed nested celtificate or a classical celtificate for the lower level CAs. In this way, CAs may choose 
to issue end-user certificates with compressed nested certificate paths only to some certificates in the system. 
Each compressed nested celtificate is created for a number of subject certificates. End-users usually apply 
for their certificates in a random manner. Thereforc, a drawback of this new model would be additional 
accumulated time spent 011 collection of those subject certificates. If each compressed nested certificate is 
supposed to verify up to n subject certificates, then this may not be achieved with a sufficient rapidity to 
satisfy end-users. Therefore, we propose to incorporate a time constraint as well as a subject certificate 
constraint on the system. The time interval may vary in any particular CNPKI application, but should be 
determined using both nested certificate creation time and nested certificate verification time. CNC creation 
takes approximately the same time as for creation of a classical certificate. In fact, in the hardware, 
processing speeds of up to 600 I 024-bit RSA signatures per second are possible (HSM 2006). This number 
is insignificant for larger verifiers that need to manage several millions of certificates per day. Thus, two 
constraints that need to be identified within our CNPKI model are: 
A waiting-time constraint T and, 
A maximum number n of subject certificates verified with each nested certificate. 
A CNC is then validated when either the waiting time constraint T is achieved or when n 
certificates have accumulated, whichever occurs first. 
The number n should not be too large as otherwise the compressed nested certificate data structure becomes 
unwieldy; on the other hand, a larger value of n results in a larger reduction in certificate repository storage 
load, which is an especially important factor for root CAs. 
4.1 Implementation of Constraints 
The method of deployment of the constraints within CNPKl depends on the requirements of the security 
environment. Where the order and consistency of the system is top priority, it is appropriate to have the 
RCA control them and fix them across the system. This would be the case for Web PKTs where certificate 
information is usually already en-coded and fixed within the software. The drawback in this situation is that 
only a small number of certificates might accumulate in some parts of the CNPKT structure before time Tis 
reached. Alternatives are to allow each CA to control n or T, or both, independently of the RCA. This is 
useful for changeable environments where flexibility and adaptability of the system is most important. This 
alternate approach is especially useful for security environments with changeable conditions, particularly 
where human factors are involved. For example, suppose that a large organization deploys a PKI structure 
across separate branches in different geographic locations each with its own CAs. It might happen that those 
branches have different strategic purposes within the organization, and that consequently security 
requirements with different certification policies for PKT are deployed. 
This leads us to define two methods for deployment of constraints within the CNPKI: 
I. Fixed - where the RCA initially sets up the values for those two constraints and publishes them within the 
certification policy (fo/lowing X.S09). 
2. Flexible- where each CA is responsible to deploy those two values independently. 
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In implementation, each CA within the CNPKI might he allowed to decide itself the number ofcertificates 
each CNC is allowed to certify, and how long it will wait for subject certificates to arrive for a certification. 
On the other hand, a general policy might be established with guidelines for deciding them. In either case, 
the algorithm below describes the actions ofa CA in generating a nested certificate. 
Algorithm/or nested certificate generation: 
Summary: Given a nested certificate time interval T and a maximum number of subject certificates certified 
by each nested certificate n, a CA should do the following: 
Set an internal clock at t=O.OO and activate it at the moment when the first subject certificate SCI arrives 
Collect all incoming subject certificates generated by the lower level CAs until either the number of them 
reaches n or the internal clock reaches the time T (i.e. t=J) 
For the i-th subject certificate SCi, where is k (where ks n is the number of subject certificates waiting to be 
certified by the nested certificate) the CA does the following: 
Assign the hash value of the content of the SCi to the CNC, 
Assign the signature value of the content of the SCi to the CNC, 
Assign the serial number of the SCi to the CNC. 
Create other celtificate fields within the CNC. 
5 PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
In order to compare performance efficiency of the CNPKl against that of classical PKT and NPKT, a 
numerical analysis of verification speed and load on servers is given below. The number of paths is specii'ic 
to the topology ofPKT. Since it is almost impossible to formulate the average path lengths and the average 
number of certificates issued by CAs for irregular graph shaped PKTs, we use a balanced tree topology, 
prevalent in practice, in the analysis. The topology analysed in this section is that of an I-level, m-ary 
balanced tree where each non-end node (or CA) issues m classical certificates for their child nodes (CAs or 
end-users), and there are 1 non-leaf node levels (l is also the length of each end-user's certificate path). 
Performance measurements took place on a P3 workstation with a speed of2.1 GHz and a RAM of256 
Mbytes, running the Windows XP operating system. Data from Figure 4 was obtained from (Levi et al. 
2004). It shows an improvement in certificate verification speed of the CNPKI model over the classical PKI. 
This improvement in verification speed, referred to as the speed-up factor, is measured as the time spent on 
cryptographic verification of a certificate with a comprcssed nested certificate path divided by the time spent 
on cryptographic verification ofa celtificate with a classical celtificate path of the same length and with the 
same algorithms used. The certificate verification speeds have small variations for different types of hash 
and digital signature algorithms deployed. Therefore, measurements were performed with different types of 
digital signature algorithms used with various lengths of keys (RSA and DSA algorithms with 512 bit, 1024 
bit and 2024 bit keys are tested) and also with different hash algorithms applied (MD5 and SHA I were used) 
and average values for certificate paths of various lengths have been used for further measurements. An 
improvement of certificate verification speed within CNPKJ over certificate verification in the classical PKI 
model is shown in Figure 4. 
The graph shows that the certificate verification speed-up factor based 011 those two models increases almost 
linearly as the certificate verification path length increases, which means that CNPKI is more efficient for 
certificates with medium to long certificate paths. Thus, if a certificate has celtificate path with length I, the 
verification of a certificate with a compressed nested certificate path is I times faster then with the classical 
certificate path. According to our comparison between Levi's NPKT and our model, the certificate 
verification speed of a certificate with a compressed nested certificate path is almost identical to the 
verification speed of a certificate with a nested certificate path. 
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Fig 4. The speed-up factor or quotient of increase in certificate verification speed of compressed nested 
certificate paths compared to classical certificate paths for different levels 1 of the tree 
In the next two figures we show an improvement in certificate load within the CNPKI model over the NPKI 
model. Figures 5 and 6 represent changes in certificate load for the whole system and for the Root CA 
respectively. Computations are performed with respect to three different factors: level of the tree I; average 
number of certificates m issued by CAs; average number of subject certificates k issued by each compressed 
nested certificate. 
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Fig 5. The total number of certificates in a system issued within classical PKI, NPKI and CNPKI with respect to l, m 
and k 
Data from Figure 5 shows that the number of certificates within the CNPKI converges towards the number 
of certificates issued within the classical PKI, whereas the number of certificates within NPKI becomes 
significantly bigger when one ofthe factors increases. 
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The average number of certificates m 
issued by a CA 
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issued by a CA 
Fig 6. The number of certificates issued by the Root CA within classical PKI, NPKI and CNPKI with 
respect to the average number of certificates m issued by a CA 
Measurements provided above show that a difference in the certificate load ofNPKI and CNPKI is 
significantly larger for the Root CA than for the whole system. This is best shown by the first graph in 
Figure 6 where the Root CA within NPKI issues more than 200,000,000 certificates, whereas the number of 
certificates issued by the Root CA within CNPKI is less than 700 for a tree oflevel 6 (i.e. if we suppose that 
m=20 and the average number of certified certificates by one CNC is k=10). In order to represent an increase 
47 
in the number of certificates in a model, Levi et al. in (2004) defined the nested certificate overhead, or 
NCO, The NCO is the quotient of the total number of certificates, defined as NTotal, in his model and the 
total number of certificates issued in classical PKI, defined as CTotal, represented as follows: 
NCO == NTatal == (I-l)(~ -I)m'-' + l. 
CTotal m -I 
(I) 
This notion can also be defined in our model as compressed nested certificate overhead, or CNCO, to 
represent the quotient of the total number of certificates in the CNPKI model, defined as C'NTotal, and the 
total number of certificates in classical PKI, as follows: 
CNCO == CNTalal == m
l
-
1 (m -1)(1- e) + 1. 
CTatal k' (1- k)(m' -I) 
(2) 
The ratio between the number of certificates issued by the Root CA in our model and in Levi's model is 
given by: 
r '1 1 (111 + I n111,_ I ) I( 111 + m I) ~ n'-l ' 
as m increases, which means that for larger n and longer certificate paths, the difference between the number 
of certificates issued within NPKI and CNPKI becomes significantly large (eg. for the number of subject 
certificates certified by one CNC n I 0 and length of a certificate path 1>3, the difference between the number 
of certificates issued by the Root CA ofCNPKI and the Root CA ofNPKI is in the thousands). Thus, with 
CNPKT we achieve fast certificate verification time with an insignificant increase in the number of 
certificates issued by upper level authorities. Therefore, CNPKI appears to be most advantageous for highly 
used public key infrastructures where keeping certificate verification time to a minimum is a priority, such 
as, for instance, the Domain Name System Security (Eastlake 1999). 
The next section will describe how our model dcals with two important issues related to certificate 
verification: certificate revocation, and certificate expiry and renewal. 
6 CERTIFICATE REVOCATIONS AND RENEWAL 
Classical digital certificates are issued with a limited lifespan, but very often they need to be revoked before 
the expiration time. However, digital certificates are hard-coded data and they can not be undone (Stallings 
2003). Therefore, CAs need to issue a separate, signed revocation statement, invalidating unexpired 
certificates. Certificates are normally revoked for one of two reasons: 
1. The user's private key (or its CA's private key) has been compromised; 
2. The relationship under which the private key was issued has changed. 
There is a number of different certificate revocation mechanisms proposed in the literature. The three most 
commonly deployed revocation models are Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs), Online Certificate Status 
Protocol (OCSP) and Certificate Revocation Trees (CRTs). 
In classical PKI the verifier should verity a path of certificates in order to trust the end-user's certificate. 
Therefore, the verifier should obtain and check the revocation status of all certificates on the path. Thus, the 
difficulty of certificate revocation control is proportional to the number of CAs involved on the path. 
A large number of compressed nested certificates (or nested certificates) are issued within the CNPKT and 
the NPKI model, and it seems that this would cause an increased certificate revocation burden in addition to 
the revocation of classical certificates in CNPKl. However, CNPKI requires only two revocation checking 
controls for a certificate path of any given length. The responsibility of the upper level CA in the 
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compressed nested celtificate path creation process is to check the trustworthiness of the lower level CA and 
its compressed nested certificate before it issues a compressed nested celtiticate for it. Therefore, an 
intermediate compressed nested celtificate fi"om the path does not need to be revoked. [n fact, it can be used 
in a path as a valid certificate even though its certifying pair of keys has been revoked or compromised. 
However, the verifier needs to check the revocation status for the first Root CA's compressed nested 
certificate in order not to start the revocation process with the bogus certificate. The revocation status forthe 
end-user's certificate should be checked independently of the PKI model it is used in. 
All classical certificates have a limited lifespan in order to limit the chance of misusing a compromised 
private key, or the privileges that a certificate holder has with the celtificate. The aim of the compressed 
nested certificate is to verifY a number of classical certificates at one time. Consequently, a compressed 
nested celtificate can exist on several compressed nested certificate paths and its expiration time depends 
only on the expiration time of its subject certificates. Therefore, when the classical certificate is revoked or 
expired at the end of one ofthose paths, a compressed nested certificate on the path should not be removed 
unless there is no other valid classical certificate verified by this certificate. It should remain in the system as 
long as there is at least one valid subject certificate to verify. Thus, a compressed nested certificate 
automatically expires when the last certificate at the end of one of its paths become invalid. Therefore, the 
expiration time period of the compressed nested certificate within the path is equal to the latest expiration 
time period defined within all its end-users' classical certificates, located at the end of all its paths. All new 
compressed nested certificates need to be reissued when the new classical certificate has been reissued. If 
classical celtificates have been temporarily revoked and are reissued latcr on, thcir original compressed 
nested certificate path can be re-used. 
7 SECURITY ASSURANCE OF CNPKI 
An important precondition of our model is that it is at least as secure as classical PKI. In other words, 
CNPKT must be resistant to those attacks common for all PKI models, such as: 
Extensive crypto-analytic attack; 
Forging a celtificate with an expired key; 
Impersonation or identity fi'aud attack; 
Bribe an employee of a CA. 
There are two possible kinds of crypto-analytic attacks on PKI: an attack on a certificate's private key and 
an attack on a hash function used in a certificate. The risk of the second attack on hash functions used by 
compressed nested certificates is larger then that for classical certificates, since a larger data space has been 
hashed in these certificates. The risk of a crypto-analytic attack on the certificate users' private keys is 
identical to the risk within the classical PKI. The solution to this kind of attack is usage of longer keys that 
need to be regularly changed. However, compressed nested certificates issued by intermediate CAs do not 
need to be revoked if the CAs' keys have expired, as long as they are issued before their expiration time. 
One factor that makes CNPKI more vulnerable is that the Root CA is regularly using a private key. In the 
classical PKT, a CA's private keys are strictly protected and activated rarely, and under strict supervision. 
The risk of forging a certificate with a CA's expired key is lower within CNPKJ than within the classical 
PKI model, since an upper level authority within CNPKT needs to check the validity of a compressed nested 
certificate issued by a lower level CA before it issues a compressed nested certificate, whereas this is not the 
case for the classical PKI model. 
It might seem that CNPKI is more vulnerable to an impersonation attack than classical PKI, since 
compressed nested certificates carry some private information (eg. subject certificate hash and signature 
values) about other users' certificates. However, data within any digital certificate is publicly available, so 
this is, in fact, not an issue. Additionally, users usually send their certificates with data signed with their 
private key, and they are the only entities that know their private key. Therefore, the CNPKI model invades 
the privacy of entities (eg. end-users and CAs) involved in a system to only a very slight extent. 
49 
The risk of a bribing an employee of a CA is slightly lower within CNPKI than within classical PKI, since 
CAs within CNPKI are more dynamically involved in the end-users' certification process than they are in 
classical PKI and there is greater control of the work oflower level CAs by upper level authorities. 
8 CONCLUSION 
In this paper we have introduced an innovative compressed nested PKI model with compressed nested 
certificates as an alternative, more efficient solution to PKI that simplifies many important components of 
the verification. A major practical advantage of our model is that for large PKIs with longer certificate paths, 
where fast and simple certificate verification is a priority, it provides both speed and simplicity. It also 
preserves the trust structure and the topology of hierarchical PKI. CNPKI can be easily integrated with 
minimal cost into existing X.509 certificate schemes. Compressed nested certificates can be built by using 
currently deployed X.509 version3 digital certificate data structures with some minimal editing to the X.509 
standard. CNPKI can be deployed either as an independent model or as an extension to classical PKls where 
entities decide which certificate path model they want to use. 
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